Planning: Risk Assessment & Treatment (Clause 6)
Learn the concrete steps of ISO/IEC 27001's risk assessment and treatment process — from setting criteria through to the four treatment options and information security objectives.
Learning Objectives
- → List the steps of a clause 6.1.2 risk assessment in order
- → Calculate a simple risk level from likelihood and impact
- → Name and distinguish the four risk treatment options
- → Explain how risk treatment connects to the Statement of Applicability
- → Write a SMART information security objective
Clause 6 is where the vocabulary from lesson 1 (asset, threat, vulnerability, risk) turns into a repeatable process with actual outputs. This is the clause auditors probe hardest, because a weak risk assessment undermines everything built on top of it — including your entire Annex A control selection.
6.1.2: Risk assessment — four steps
1. Establish and apply risk criteria
Before assessing anything, you decide how you'll judge risk. This means defining:
- A risk acceptance criteria (what level of risk is tolerable — e.g., "any risk scoring above 12 on our 5×5 matrix requires treatment")
- Criteria for performing assessments (consistency requirement — the same kind of risk should be scored the same way regardless of who assesses it)
Skipping this step is a common Foundation-level mistake: jumping straight to "what could go wrong?" without first defining what "too risky" even means for your organization produces inconsistent, unauditable results.
2. Identify risks
Systematically identify risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information within the ISMS scope. In practice this usually means walking through your information assets (or your critical business processes) and asking, for each: what could threaten it, and through what vulnerability?
3. Analyze risks
For each identified risk, assess:
- Likelihood — how probable is this, realistically, given your existing controls?
- Impact / consequence — how bad would it be if it happened?
Most organizations use a simple matrix:
Impact →
Low Medium High
Likelihood
Low 1 2 3
Medium 2 4 6
High 3 6 9
A risk scoring 9 (high likelihood × high impact) clearly needs attention before one scoring 1 — the point of analysis is to make prioritization defensible with numbers, not gut feeling alone.
4. Evaluate risks
Compare the analyzed risk level against the acceptance criteria from step 1, and prioritize which risks need treatment. Risks below the acceptance threshold can be knowingly accepted (see below) — that is a legitimate outcome, not a failure to act.
6.1.3: Risk treatment — four options
Once you know which risks need treatment, you choose one (or a combination) of four standard responses:
| Option | What it means | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Modify (mitigate) | Reduce likelihood or impact via a control | Add MFA to reduce the likelihood of account takeover |
| Retain (accept) | Knowingly keep the risk, because treating it costs more than the risk is worth | Accept the small residual risk of a rare, low-impact event |
| Avoid | Eliminate the activity that creates the risk entirely | Stop offering a legacy feature that requires an insecure protocol |
| Share (transfer) | Move part of the risk to another party | Buy cyber insurance; use a payment processor instead of storing card data yourself |
Whichever options you choose, residual risk remains — no treatment reduces risk to zero. Clause 6.1.3 explicitly requires obtaining risk owners' approval of the risk treatment plan and their acceptance of residual risk. This is not a technicality: someone with real authority has to knowingly sign off that "yes, this remaining risk is acceptable to the organization," rather than it being silently assumed.
The bridge to Annex A: the Statement of Applicability
Clause 6.1.3 is also where the Statement of Applicability (SoA) is introduced — it's the document that records, for every one of the 93 Annex A controls, whether it's included or excluded, and why, linked back to your risk treatment decisions. A later lesson covers building an SoA in depth; for now, the key point is that the SoA isn't a separate creative exercise — it's the direct output of the risk treatment decisions made here in clause 6.
6.2: Information security objectives
Clause 6.2 requires setting measurable security objectives, consistent with the policy from clause 5. A weak objective is vague: "improve security awareness." A strong objective is SMART — Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound: "95% of staff complete phishing awareness training by the end of Q2, verified via the training platform's completion report." Auditors will ask to see the measurement evidence, not just the objective statement.
An online store's payment page has no rate limiting on login attempts (a known issue). Credential-stuffing attacks against e-commerce sites are common (assess likelihood as Medium). If successful, an attacker could access saved payment methods for many customers (assess impact as High). Using the 3x3 matrix from the lesson, calculate the risk score, and state whether it likely exceeds a typical acceptance threshold of 4.
Using the lesson's matrix, what is the risk score for Medium likelihood x High impact?
For each scenario, name the risk treatment option (modify, retain, avoid, or share) being used: (a) a company stops accepting a legacy, insecure file-upload format entirely rather than trying to secure it, (b) a company purchases cyber insurance to cover potential breach costs, (c) a company formally documents and signs off that a very low, rare risk is acceptable as-is.
Purchasing cyber insurance to cover potential breach costs is which risk treatment option?
A company discontinuing a legacy insecure feature entirely, rather than trying to secure it, is which risk treatment option?
Rewrite the vague objective 'reduce the number of security incidents' into a SMART objective, including a specific metric, a target, and a deadline.
What does the 'M' in SMART objectives stand for, and why does it matter for clause 6.2 audits?